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I give thee, cronlib and puppet-cron-analyzer

Posted: June 11th, 2012 | Author: | Filed under: DevOps | Tags: , , , | No Comments »

I’ve been working on a puppet cron analyzer tool, which is coming along nicely:

Its goal was to provide an analysis/map of cron runtimes, but it turns out that simply regex searching across all crons in an infrastructure is the most useful part. (and it works now)
Also, to build this, I had to create a library to convert cron entries (like what you’d see on-disk), into normalized entries (with only lists of numbers). Cronlib also supports dumping a list of all timestamps a cron will run at (huge list!), based on a days argument. See for a nice way to create a time_map, to avoid storing duplicates of these huge lists.
More to come as puppet-cron-analyzer progresses.

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Multi-user Security in Linux

Posted: March 15th, 2010 | Author: | Filed under: Linux / Unix, Security | Tags: , | 2 Comments »

A wise man once said, “everyone is root if you allow them to login as a user,” in retort to a question about the security of a multi-user Linux system. There is plenty of truth in that, but just accepting eminent compromise isn’t always acceptable. Let’s take a look at how you can limit your exposure while letting unknown and untrusted users login with a shell.

There are basically two groups of people who’d want to restrict login users heavily. First, the collaborators, possibly two separate organizations that have been forced to work together. Second, people who wish to allow some shady characters access to a shell, but believe they may attempt to compromise security. If at all possible, the best policy is to simply not give access out, and if you do, make sure patches are applied daily.

To say that you simply shouldn’t give out shells to untrustworthy users may work in a few instances. Say, for example, there is a need for remote users at another site to login and run the same series of commands every day. Say, for the sake of argument, their task can be easily scripted. If this is their only purpose on the server, a shell certainly isn’t necessary. OpenSSH allows a set of restrictions to be applied to an SSH key.

At the end of an SSH key entry, you can tack on these options:
This effectively restricts any SSH connections using this key to only being allowed to run the mentioned script. This can even be a setuid script that restarts a web server, for example. It’s quite safe, because OpenSSH will reject any variation of the command= text. Users possessing this key will only be able to execute the command that is explicitly allowed.

Aside from that, and possibly some fancy web-based tools or cron jobs, there aren’t may options left. At times users just need to be able to login and work.

It should go without saying that you need to stay up-to-date on patches. We won’t focus too much on that, aside from saying: automate! Securing a machine is an entirely different topic all together, but here are a few points to consider.

Enabling SELinux (Security-Enhanced Linux) is your first line of defense against unknown attacks. SELinux can prevent buffer overflows, as opposed to simply taking the “updates” path, which requires that a publicly known hole be fixed before some tries to exploit it. SELinux provides a significantly improved access system to limit programs from accessing things they don’t require to be operational. That, combined with overflow prevention makes it quite difficult to compromise a Linux system.

Further, on the issue of securing a multi-user machine, there is a much-debated precept: that users shouldn’t be able to see what processes are running, unless they own them. This restriction is simple to enable in Linux and the BSD’s, but does it really buy you anything? The answer is “maybe,” and at the same time, “not really.” To satisfy the maybe camp, consider a process’s arguments. When you run a command with a given set of arguments, the command as well as the arguments will show up in a ‘ps’ listing. If you have provided a password on the command-line for some reason, it will be visible to anyone running a ‘ps’ while your process is still running. Many people think that allowing users to see running daemon processes on a server will allow them to know what to try attacking. This information is trivial to obtain via other means anyway, so “not really.”

Every time this discussion starts, someone quickly suggests a chroot jail. The chroot command stands for “change root,” which does just that. If you run the command: ‘chroot /home/charlie /bin/bash’ then chroot will look for the shell in /home/charlie/bin/bash, and then proceed to lock you into that directory. The new root of the file system, for the lifetime of the bash shell, is /home/charlie. You now have zero access to any other part of the actual file system. Any available command, and its required libraries, needs to be copied into the chroot jail. Providing a usable environment is a ton of work. It’s actually easier to give each user their own Linux Xen or Solaris Zone instance. Really.

Finally we come to the restricted shells. The most popular, rbash, is a restricted bash shell. Setting a user’s shell to rbash will provide absolutely zero security. In theory, rbash will prevent users from running anything by specifying a full path, including ‘./’ (the current directory). This implies that it’s difficult for users to run commands, including scripts they write or downloaded exploits. Since $PATH is controlled globally, users can only run things in those locations. Unfortunately, /bin/ is going to need to be in their path, so all a user needs to do is run a new shell, and rbash is no longer in the picture: ‘exec bash’

One method of alleviating this is to give users only one item in their path, a directory the administrator created. Within the directory, simply place symlinks to all the authorized commands. This is nearly as cumbersome as setting up chroot, but much more tolerable.

Security isn’t convenient, and if it is, you’re doing something wrong.

There are certainly ways to prevent users from running downloaded programs, but in the end, the multi-user security of a system will depend on security of every piece of software installed. Preventing the exploits from being successful, a la SELinux, adds the most viable method of protection. Coupled with a frequently updated system, additional restrictions such as rbash aren’t generally necessary.


The Perils of Sudo With User Passwords

Posted: February 25th, 2010 | Author: | Filed under: IT Management, Linux / Unix | Tags: , | 28 Comments »

The consensus among new Unix and Linux users seems to be that sudo is more secure than using the root account, because it requires you type your password to perform potentially harmful actions. In reality, a compromised user account, which is no big deal normally, is instantly root in most setups. This sudo thinking is flawed, but sudo is actually useful for what’s it was designed for.

The (wrong) idea is that you shouldn’t use the root account, because apparently it’s too “dangerous.” This argument usually comes from new Linux users and people that call themselves “network administrators,” but has no basis in reality. We’ll come back to that in a moment.

The concept behind sudo is to give non-root users access to perform specific tasks without giving away the root password. It can also be used to log activity, if desired. Role-based access control isn’t available in Linux, so sudo is a great alternative, if used properly. Solaris 10 has greatly improved RBAC capabilities; so you can easily allow a junior admin access to web server restart scripts with the appropriate access levels, for example. Sudo is supposed to be configured to allow a certain set of people to run a very limited set of commands, as a different user.

Unfortunately, sysadmins and home users alike have begun using sudo for everything. Instead of running ‘su’ and becoming root, they believe that ‘sudo’ plus ‘command’ is a better alternative. Most of the time, sysadmins with full sudo access just end up running ‘sudo bash’ and doing all their work from that root shell. This is a problem.

Using a user account password to get a root shell is a bad idea.

Why is there a separate root account anyway? It isn’t to simply protect you from your own mistakes. If all sysadmins just become root using their user password (running: sudo bash), then why not just give them uid 0 (aka root) and be done with it? For a group of sysadmins, the only reason they should want to use sudo is for logging of commands. Unfortunately, this provides zero additional security or auditing, because an attacker would just run a shell. If sysadmins are un-trusted such that they need to be audited, they shouldn’t have root access in the first place.

Surprisingly, the home-user rational makes its way into the workplace as well. The recurring argument is that running a root shell is dangerous. Partially to blame for this grave misunderstanding is X login managers, for allowing the root user to login. New users are always scolded and explained to that running X as root is wrong. The same goes for many other applications, too. As time progressed, people started remembering that “running as root” is wrong, passing this idology down to their children, but without any details. A genetic mutation may have occurred, but insufficient research has been done on that topic thus far. Now that Ubuntu Linux doesn’t enable a root account by default, but instead allows full root access to the user via sudo, the world will never be the same.

People praise sudo, while demeaning Windows at the same time for not having any separation of privileges by default. The answer to security clearly is a multi-user system with privilege separation, but sudo blurs these lines in its most common usage. The Ubuntu usage of sudo simply provides a hoop to jump through, requiring users to type their password more often than they’d like. Of course this will prevent a user’s web browser from running something as root, but it isn’t security.

We’d really like to focus on the Enterprise, where sudo has very little place.

The sudo purists, or sudoists, we’ll call them, would have you run sudo before every command that requires root. Apparently running ‘sudo vi /etc/resolv.conf’ is supposed to make you remember that you’re root, and prevent mistakes. Sudoists will also say that it protects against “accidentally left open root shells” as well. If there are accidental shells left on computers with public access, well that’s an HR action item.

Sudo atheists will quickly point out that using sudo without specifically defined commands in the configuration file is a security risk. Sudoists user account passwords have root access, so in essence, sudo has un-done all security mechanisms in place. SSH doesn’t allow root to login, but with sudo, a compromised user password removes that restriction.

In a true multi-user environment, every so often a root compromise will happen. If users can login, they can eventually become root, and that’s just a fact of life. The first thing any old-school cracker installs is a hacked SSH program, to log user passwords. Ideally, this single hacked machine doesn’t have any sort of trust relationship with other computers, because users are allowed access. The next time an administrator logs into the hacked machine, his user account is compromised. Generally this isn’t a big deal, but with sudo, this means a complete root compromise, probably for all machines. Of course SSH keys can help, as will requiring separate passwords for administrators on the more important (non user accessible) servers; but if they’re willing to allow their user account access to unrestricted root-level commands, then it’s unlikely that there’s any other security in place elsewhere.

As we mentioned, sudo has its place. Allowing a single command to be run with elevated privileges in an operating system that doesn’t support such things is quite useful. Still, be very careful about who gets this access, even for one item. As with all software, sudo isn’t without bugs.

For the love of security, please, we beg of you, do not use sudo for full root access. Administrators keep separate, non-UID 0 accounts for a reason, and it’s not for “limiting the mistakes.” Everything should be done from a root shell, and you should have to know an uber-secret root password to access anything as root.


Back to Basics: Unix System Stats Utilities

Posted: February 24th, 2010 | Author: | Filed under: Linux / Unix | Tags: , , , , , | No Comments »

Unix and Linux systems have forever been obtuse and mysterious for many people. They generally don’t have nice graphical utilities for displaying system performance information; you need to know how to coax the information you need. Furthermore, you need to know how to interpret the information you’re given. Let’s take a look at some common system tools that can provide tons of visibility into what the opaque OS is really doing.

Unfortunately, the same tools don’t exist universally across all Unix variants. A few commonly underused ones do, however, and that is what we’ll focus on first.

Disk Activity
A common source of “slowness” is disk I/O, or rather the lack of available I/O. On Linux especially, it may be a difficult diagnosis. Often the load average will climb quickly, but without any corresponding processes in top eating much CPU. Linux counts “iowait” as CPU time when calculating load average. I’ve seen load numbers in the tens of thousands, on more than one occasion.

The easiest way to see what’s happening to your disks is to run the ‘iostat’ program. Via iostat, you can see how many read and write operations are happening per device, how much CPU is being utilized, and how long each transaction takes. Many arguments are available for iostat, so do spend some time with the man page on your specific system. By default, running ‘iostat’ with no arguments produces a report about disk IO since boot. To get a snapshot of “now” add a numerical argument last, which will prompt iostat to gather statistics for that number of seconds.

Linux will show number of blocks read or written per second, along with some useful CPU statistics. This is one particularly busy server:

 avg-cpu:  %user   %nice %system %iowait  %steal   %idle
 1.36    0.07    5.21   23.80    0.00   69.57
Device:   tps   Blk_read/s   Blk_wrtn/s   Blk_read   Blk_wrtn
sda       18.22     15723.35       643.25 65474958946 2678596632

Notice that iowait is at 23%. This means that 23% of the time this server is waiting on disk I/O. Some Solaris iostat output shows a similar thing, just represented differently(iostat -xnz):

    r/s    w/s   kr/s   kw/s wait actv wsvc_t asvc_t  %w  %b device
295.3   79.7 5657.8  211.0  0.0 10.3    0.0   27.4   0 100 d101
134.8   16.4 4069.8  116.0  0.0  3.5    0.0   23.3   0  90 d105

The %b (block) column shows that I/O to device d101 is 100% blocked waiting for the device to complete transaction. The average service time isn’t good either: disk reads shouldn’t take 27.4ms. Arguably, Solaris’s output is more friendly to parse, since it gives the reads per second in kilobytes rather than blocks. We can quickly calculate that this server is reading about 19KB per read by dividing the number of KB read per second by the number of reads that happened. In short: this disk array is being taxed by large amounts of read requests.

The ‘vmstat’ program is also universally available, and extremely useful. It, too, provides vastly different information among operating systems. The vmstat utility will show you statistics about the virtual memory subsystem, or to put it simply: swap space. It is much more complex than just swap, as nearly every IO operation involves the VM system when pages of memory are allocated.A disk write, network packet send, and the obvious “program allocates RAM” all impact what you see in vmstat.

Running vmstat with the -p argument will print out statistics about disk IO. In Solaris you get some disk information anyway, as seen below:

 kthr      memory            page            disk
 faults      cpu  r b w   swap
free  re  mf pi po fr de sr m0 m1 m2 m7
in   sy   cs us sy id  0 0 0 7856104 526824 386 2401 0 0 0  0  0  3  0  0  0
16586 22969 12576 8 9 83  1 0 0 7851344 522016 18 678 32 0  0  0  0  2
0  0  0 13048 11737 10197 7 6 86  0 0 0 7843584 514128 76 3330 197 0
0 0  0  2  0  0  0 4762 131492 4441 16 8 76

A subtle, but important differences between Solaris and Linux is that Solaris will start scanning for pages of memory that can be freed before it will actually start swapping RAM to disk. The ‘sr’ column, scan rate, will start increasing right before swapping takes place, and continue until some RAM is available. The normal things are available in all operating systems; these include: swap space, free memory, pages in and out (careful, this doesn’t mean swapping is happening), page faults, context switches, and some CPU idle/system/user statistics. Once you know how to interpret these items you quickly learn to infer what they indicate about the usage of your system.

The two main programs for finding “slowness” are therefore iostat and vmstat. Before the obligatory tangent into “what Dtrace can do for you,” here’s a few other tools that no Unix junkie should leave home without:

Lists open files (including network ports) for all processes
Lists all sockets in use by the system
Shows CPU statistics (including IO), per-processor

We cannot talk about system visibility without mentioning Dtrace. Invented by Sun, Dtrace provides dynamic tracing of everything about a system. Dtrace gives you the ability to ask any arbitrary question about the state of a system, which works by calling “probes” within the kernel. That sounds intimidating, doesn’t it?

Let’s say that we wanted to know what files were being read or written on our Linux server that has a high iowait percentage. There’s simply no way to know. Let’s ask the same question of Solaris, and instead of learning Dtrace, we’ll find something useful in the Dtrace ToolKit. In the kit, you’ll find a few neat programs like iosnoop and iotop, which will tell you which processes are doing all the disk IO operations. Neat, but we really want to know what files are being accessed so much. In the FS directory, the rfileio.d script will provide this information. Run it, and you’ll see every file that’s read or written, and cache hit statistics. There’s no way to get this information in other Unixes, and this is just one simple example of how Dtrace is invaluable.

The script itself is about 90 lines, inclusive of comments, but the bulk of it is dealing with cache statistics. An excellent way to start learning Dtrace is to simply read the Dtrace ToolKit scripts.

Don’t worry if you’re not a Solaris admin: Dtrace is coming soon to a FreeBSD near you. SystemTap, a replica of Dtrace, will be available for Linux soon as well. Until then, and even afterward, the above mentioned tools will still be invaluable. If you can quickly get disk IO statistics and see if you’re swapping the majority of system performance problems are solved. Dtrace also provides amazing application tracing functionality, and if you’re looking at the application itself, you already know the slowness isn’t likely being caused by a system problem.

Soon, I’ll publish a few Dtrace tutorials.

Some things have surely been left out – discuss below!

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Back To Basics: Unix Differences in Performing Tasks

Posted: February 23rd, 2010 | Author: | Filed under: Linux / Unix | Tags: , , , , , | 3 Comments »

It has often been said that a skilled sysadmin can quickly come up to speed with any Unix system in a matter of hours. After all, the underlying principals are all the same. Fortunately, this is somewhat correct. Unfortunately, this also leads to people making changes on systems they do not understand, often times in suboptimal ways.

In this final Back to Basics With Unix piece, we’d like to spend some time talking about some common, routine sysadmin tasks and how they differ between Unix variants.

Sure, you can clunk around and change configuration files to mostly make something work on a foreign system. But will those changes remain after security patches get applied and stomp all over your work? Did you just change a file that was meant to never change, because there’s a separate file for local modifications? If you’re not familiar with “how it’s done” in that particular OS, it’s as likely as not.

Yes, I make fun of GUI configuration utilities. People that don’t understand systems often use them and “get by,” but they cannot fix things when they break, unless the GUI tool can do it for them. That said, they do have their place. When learning a new system, it often makes sense to use the provided configuration utilities, as you know without a doubt they will adjust the necessary setting they way the OS wants it done. Here’s a list of some handy general administration GUIs:

– AIX: smitty (does pretty much everything)
– FreeBSD: sysinstall (not recommended for use after the initial install, but it works)
– HP-UX: sam (like AIX’s smitty)
– Linux: system-config, webmin and many others (distro-dependant)
– Solaris: admintool, wbem (use with caution)

Often, these tools still don’t do what you need. They certainly don’t help you learn a system unless you take the time to examine what the tool actually changed. Let’s start off with the basics: gathering system information and managing hardware. It can be a nightmare to add a disk to a foreign system, so hopefully this list will get you steered in the proper direction.

Show hardware configuration:
– AIX: lsdev, lscfg, prtconf
– FreeBSD: /var/run/dmesg.boot, pciconf
– HP-UX: ioscan, model, getconf, print_manifest
– Linux: dmesg, lspci, lshw, dmidecode
– Solaris: prtconf, prtdiag, psrinfo, cfgadm

Note that ‘dmesg’ is a circular kernel buffer on most systems, and after the machine has been up for a while the boot information listing devices gets overwritten. FreeBSD thoughtfully saves it in dmesg.boot for you, but in other systems you’re left relying on the above-mentioned exploratory tools.

Add a new device (have the OS discover it without a reboot):
– AIX: cfgmgr
– FreeBSD: atacontrol, camcontrol
– HP-UX: ioscan, insf
– Linux: udev, hotplug (automatic)
– Solaris: devfsadm, disks, devlinks (all a hardlink to the same binary now)

If you connect a new internal disk and need it recognized, you should not need to reboot in the Unix world. The above commands will discover new devices and make them available. If you’re talking about SAN disks, the utilities are mostly the same, but there are other programs that make the process much easier and also allow for multipathing configurations.

Label and partition a disk:
– AIX: mkvg then mklv
– FreeBSD: fdisk or sysinstall
– HP-UX: pvcreate then lvcreate, or sam
– Linux: fdisk or others
– Solaris: format or fmthard

Of course, you’ll also want to create a file system on your new disk. This is newfs or mkfs everywhere, with the exception of AIX which forces you to use crfs. The filesystem tab file, which describes file systems and mount options, vary a bit as well. In Linux, FreeBSD, and HP-UX it is /etc/fstab, Solaris uses /etc/vfstab, and AIX references /etc/filesystems. We spent so much time on filesystems and hardware because that’s the generally the biggest hurdle when learning a new system, and when you’re needing to do it, often you’re in a hurry.

Other tasks may or may not be covered by GUI utilities in the various flavors of Unix, so here’s a few more that we deem crucial to understand.

Display IP information and change IP address permanently:
– AIX: ifconfig/lsattr; smitty or chdev
– FreeBSD: ifconfig; /etc/rc.conf
– HP-UX: ifconfig/lanadmin; set_params
– Linux: ‘ip addr’; /etc/sysconfig/network or /etc/network/interfaces
– Solaris: ifconfig; edit /etc/hosts, /etc/hostname.*

Linux will of course vary, but those two files cover the most popular distros.

When taking over a foreign system, we frequently want to two two things: install missing software (like GNU utilities), and verify that the system is up-to-date on security patches. Where to get packages and where to gete latest security patches varies too much to cover here—you’ll likely need to search to the OS in question—but the way you install packages and show installed patches is extremely useful to know.

List installed patches:
– AIX: instfix, oslevel
– FreeBSD: uname
– HP-UX: swlist
– Linux: rpm, dpkg
– Solaris: showrev

Install packages:
– AIX: smitty, rpm, installp
– FreeBSD: pkg_add, portinstall, sysinstall
– HP-UX: swinstall
– Linux: rpm, yum, apt, yast, etc.
– Solaris: pkgadd

As you can see, things vary immensely between the Unix variants. Even within all of Linux you can easily find yourself lost. Google is a friend to all sysadmins, but too often the conceptual questions go unanswered. Here’s a general rule of thumb, and something I’ve seen done incorrectly too many times: if you see a configuration file in /etc/, say syslog.conf, and there is an accompanying syslog.d directory, you are not supposed to edit the syslog.conf file directly. The same goes for pam.conf and pam.d. Each service will have their own file within the .d directory, and that is where they are configured.

The .d directory example is mostly applicable to Linux, but be sure to pay attention when you see similar multi-config layouts anywhere else. Future sysadmins using the system will thank you if the OS’s conventions are followed and it’s easy to identify customizations. It also means that your changes aren’t likely to be stomped over by updates.


LDAP: Understand the Protocol and Work With Entries

Posted: February 22nd, 2010 | Author: | Filed under: Linux / Unix | Tags: , | No Comments »

Last week we explained how LDAP directories work, without really explaining how to use them. This week we’ll show how LDAP queries work, after explaining how the protocol works.

The LDAP protocol supports just a few fairly easy to understand operations. Knowing what’s available provides administrators with the ability to surmise how various applications are using LDAP, troubleshoot issues, and construct their own search queries and filters more effectively.

A client, be it a PHP script, command-line program like ldapsearch, or LDAP libraries for user authentication in Unix, will connect to a server on port 389 (or 636 with SSL), and send one of roughly a dozen operation requests. The following operations define how the LDAP protocol works:

Binding is the pivotal concept to understand. It is optional, depending on access control restrictions defined in the server. The act of binding is authentication: it sends a user’s DN and password. Binding anonymously may not allow access to all directory entries, or it may not be allowed at all, again depending on how the server is configured.

Search or Compare
Search is used to both list entries and search for them. Searching supports a number of parameters, which define how the search is carried out.

  • Base: object to start at
  • Scope: how much to search; one entry only, a single level below, or the entire subtree below
  • Filter: limit (optimize) search based on attribute/value or object filters
  • derefAliases: whether or not to follow alias entries
  • attributes: which attributes to return (none specified means return all)
  • sizeLimit, timeLimit: number of entries to return, and a time limit
  • typesOnly: just return the attribute types, not the actual values

Add, Delete, Modify (Update types)
Updating an LDAP entry can take the form of three operations: add, delete, or modify. Actually four, because modify can modify either an entry or a DN. As was explained last week, modifying the DN simply means moving an entry. Add and Delete do the obvious.

Extended Operations
Extended operations can be added at will. For example, many servers support the STARTTLS command, tells the server to start a secure connection.

An Abandon operation will abandon any operation, hopefully. There is no guarantee the server will honor an abandon request.

Unbind abandons any outstanding operations and disconnects a client.

As mentioned before, LDAP is pretty simple. You can connect, search or update entries, and then disconnect. Nearly every LDAP communication follows those three steps.

So how does one connect? The majority of connections to an LDAP server are made by LDAP client programs on a Unix machine, in environments that use LDAP for server directory services. Web applications often gather and display directory information, or use LDAP to authenticate people. Aside from those, LDAP connections can also be made by Perl or even shell scripts to manage the information within. When you want to manually search or update information, you will generally use some common tools such as ldapsearch, ldapvi, or ldapmodify.

Searching an LDAP directory can be challenging if you’ve never done it before. The command-line utilities have a few arguments that aren’t optional. Let’s take a look at an ldapsearch example:
ldapsearch –h –b ou=People,dc=example,dc=com uid=charlie

The ldapsearch program, in most Unix/Linux environments, take the same arguments. You must specify a server (-h) and a base (-b) to begin searching at. The base can be as broad or as specific as you’d like. We’ve chose to start searching at the ou (organizational unit) called people, withing the domain components used to designate our portion of the tree. I could have left out the ou=People portion, but if there is anything else at the level below dc=example, then it would search through those too. It faster to specify the subtree as close to the entry as possible, if you know it. Finally, the last argument was a search filter. I stated that I was interested in all entries where the value of the attribute uid was “charlie.”

The previous example used an anonymous bind, since a DN wasn’t specified. If you need to search information that is restricted to certain people, then specifying –D followed by a user DN will cause ldapsearch to bind as that user, and prompt for a password.

Search filters can be quite complex. When you’re searching manually with ldapsearch, you probably won’t get very complex. When writing a script that could potentially be run very often, you want as optimal a search as possible. Search filters can specify many thing, including what object classes to look for. It’s all about providing as many hints to the server as possible, so that it may make best use of its search indexes.

A search filter has a few basic operators, including “and” and “or” operators. The general syntax is similar to RPN (for math geeks) or functional languages (for programmers). If we want to search for a person whose given name is Bob, and mail attribute is also bob, we could use a search filter of:

If we wanted to return all entries where either bob is the givenName or the mail attribute, we could simply specify: (|(givenName=bob)(mail=bob))
Notice the | symbol, followed by two or more attribute/value pairs. In reality, we would really want to specify what object class we’re looking for, if this was used in a script: (&(objectClass=person)(|(givenName=bob)(mail=bob)))
The filter ensures that the objectClass is person, and the other nested statement is true. Again, we’re just trying to give as many hints to the server as possible.

An LDAP URL is similar, but it contains all the information necessary to both identify a server and perform a search. URLs similar to this one, or portions of it, may be required to configure some LDAP clients: ldap://,dc=example,dc=com?one?(pod=evil)

The general format is: ldap://host:port/BaseDN?attributes?scope?filter

LDAP is extremely powerful, and is certainly the best place for server-based directory information and people information. If you already live in an LDAP environment, hopefully you have a better understanding now. If you’re pondering an LDAP deployment, go and unleash the power now.

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